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DOCTRINAL REFORM AND POST-CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATIONS IN 
NEW BRUNSWICK: NAV CANADA v. GREATER FREDERICTON AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY INC. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It frequently happens, especially with enduring contracts, that either or both 
contracting parties wish to change the contract as they go. Where the contract itself does 
not provide a procedure for making variations (or, if it does, the parties for whatever 
reason omit to follow that procedure), the parties can always vary their contract 
informally. Informal variations, however, can generate some thorny legal issues, 
especially if the variation privileges one party only (for example, the variation is that the 
contractor will be paid more simply to finish what the original contract already requires 
of him), or if the promisor assented to the variation because the promisee had the 
promisor “over a barrel”, so to speak. To be sure, a number of technical legal rules 
potentially come into play in post-contractual modification situations. Two such rules are 
the “pre-existing duty rule”, inside contract law’s consideration doctrine, and “economic 
duress”. 
The application of both sets of rules was recently tested by the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal in Nav Canada v. Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc.1 The 
Court2 ultimately abandoned altogether the “classical” requirement for fresh 
consideration in support of an informal post-contractual modification, leaving the 
enforceability of such modifications to be determined instead by the modern doctrine of 
economic duress. In that connection, the Court propounded a new analytical framework 
for adjudicating economic duress claims, and one that discards, at least for restitutionary 
or declaratory remedial purposes, the need for proof of “illegitimacy” in the pressure 
applied. With respect, neither move is self-evidently correct or desirable. While 
abandonment of the pre-existing duty rule might well prove to be theoretically 
unobjectionable, all things considered, the Court’s reform of the economic duress rules 
was, with respect, unconvincing in terms of principle and policy, and it was unnecessary 
for resolving the litigation in any event. Such a reform initiative, if followed by future 
courts, will leave Canada with an analytical framework for duress that is conceptually 
inferior to the prior, and relatively stable, Anglo-Commonwealth jurisprudence on the 
subject, which jurisprudence had, at least until the Nav Canada decision, achieved 
general, if not universal, acceptance among Canadian intermediate courts and legal 
commentators. 
 
2. The Facts and Reasoning in Nav Canada 
 
(a) The Facts and Issues 
 
Nav Canada and the Greater Fredericton Airport Authority (“the Airport”) entered 
into an Aviation and Services Facilities Agreement (“the ASF Agreement”) under which 
																																																								
1  (2008), 290 D.L.R. (4th) 405, (2008), 229 N.B.R. (2d) 328 (Nav Canada). 
2  Turnbull, Larlee and Robertson JJ.A., the judgment of the Court being delivered by Robertson J.A. 
	 2
the former agreed to supply the latter with aviation services and equipment. By federal 
prerogative, Nav Canada had the exclusive right to provide such services to the Airport, 
hence affording it monopoly status relative to that party. 
The Airport chose to extend one of its runways and asked Nav Canada to relocate 
the existing instrument landing system to the runway under extension. Nav Canada 
decided that in moving the system it would make better economic sense to replace an old 
part of the system with a new navigational aid called a “DME” (distance measuring 
equipment). The acquisition of the DME would cost $223,000 and a dispute arose 
between the parties as to which of them should bear that cost. Nav Canada impliedly 
refused to provide the DME unless the Airport agreed to pay the $223,000. This was 
something that, on the proper construction of the AFS Agreement, the Airport was not 
contractually bound to do. The Airport, who insisted that it had no obligation to pay, was 
nevertheless concerned that the extended runway became operational. In order to ensure 
that result, it agreed “under protest” to pay the amount demanded by Nav Canada. On the 
strength of that post-contractual modification of the parties’ original agreement, Nav 
Canada went ahead and installed the necessary equipment. The Airport, however, 
subsequently refused to pay the agreed amount and the parties, at first instance, agreed to 
arbitrate the dispute. 
By the time the matter reached the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, the parties’ 
dispute had essentially reduced to two questions governing the enforceability of the post-
contractual modification: (1) Was the modification supported by consideration moving 
from the promisee, Nav Canada, in support of the promisor’s, the Airport’s, undertaking 
to pay? (2) If consideration did exist, was the modification nevertheless unenforceable 
(i.e., voidable at the promisor’s option) on the ground of economic duress? 
In answering those questions, the Court in Nav Canada engaged in so-called 
“incremental” doctrinal reform, both to the consideration doctrine (by abandoning the 
requirement for consideration in support of an executory bilateral contract of variation) 
and to the doctrine of duress (by refusing to recognize “illegitimacy” of pressure as an 
essential component of economic duress in cases involving a post-contractual 
modification of an executory contract, and developing instead a new, distinctively 
“consent”-focused, analytical framework for adjudicating such claims). The Court’s 
reasoning in support of each reform initiative is now explained, before it is critically 
examined in the closing section of this comment. 
 
(b) The “Consideration” Issue: Reforming the Pre-Existing Duty Rule by Abandoning 
It 
 
Because the Court construed the Airport’s promise to pay for the DME as an 
informal variation to an existing contract (and not, as the arbitrator had found, a “separate 
contract”), it had to be asked, at least according to the traditional rules, whether that 
promise was supported by consideration on the part of Nav Canada as promisee. That 
question followed ex necessitate because, since an informal variation of an existing 
contract is itself a contract,3 it must conform to the usual prerequisites for the assumption 
																																																								
3  See, e.g., British and Benningtons Ltd. v. N.W. Cachar Tea Co., [1923] A.C. 48 (H.L.), at pp. 62 and 
69; United Dominion Corp. (Jamaica) Ltd. v. Shoucair, [1969] 1 A.C. 340 (P.C.), at p. 347; 
Commissioner of Taxation v. Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (2000), 201 
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of a legal contractual commitment, including the requirement that consideration, in the 
form of a bargained-for legal detriment, must move from the promisee. However, what 
Nav Canada was offering here in return for the Airport’s undertaking to pay — a promise 
to acquire and install the DME — was something that, as a matter of the Court’s 
construction of the ASF Agreement, Nav Canada was itself obligated to fund, that is, 
once it had exercised its contractual right to insist on purchasing new navigational 
equipment rather than relocating the old. On orthodox principles, this raised a legal 
problem for Nav Canada, in the form of the well-known “pre-existing duty rule” from 
Stilk v. Myrick4 — a rule that has been recognized and applied many times by 
intermediate appellate courts in Canada.5 According to that rule, Nav Canada’s purported 
consideration could not function as “legal” consideration, because what it was promising 
to do in return for the Airport’s agreement to modify the contract as requested did not 
exceed that to which the Airport was already entitled (or at least from which it was in law 
already immune) under the ASF Agreement.6 There was, in other words, no legal 
detriment moving from the promisee in support of the promisor’s undertaking. Nav 
Canada was offering the Airport nothing in return for the latter’s promise to pay for 
something that it, the Airport, was not contractually bound to pay, and the purported 
assumption of obligation by Nav Canada was, therefore, in legal contemplation a “mere 
tautology”7 — a case, as it were, of the promisee “selling the same thing twice”.8 
Having enumerated the “classical” pre-existing duty rule, Robertson J.A. then 
proceeded to note a number of familiar techniques by which Canadian (and other British 
Commonwealth) courts have managed to circumvent the rule, typically in a fiction-
creating way, because of judicial perceptions of its defects.9 His Honour10 then contrasted 
the English Court of Appeal’s more overt “relaxation” of the consideration requirement 
in relation to informal contract variations in Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls 
(Contractors) Ltd.11 Although there was, in that case, clearly no legal detriment in the 
contractor’s promising to pay more than the original contract price in exchange for the 
subcontractor’s simply performing his obligations to complete the carpentry work 
stipulated for under the subcontract, the promisee’s new obligation being 
indistinguishable from the old, all three members of the Court agreed that consideration 
																																																																																																																																																																					
C.L.R. 520 (H.C.A.), at p. 533. 
4  (1809), 2 Camp. 317, 170 E.R. 1168. The rule states that performance by the promisee of a pre-
existing legal obligation inter se, or a promise by that party to perform such an obligation, is not 
sufficient (i.e., “valid”) consideration to support a contract variation in favour of the promisee. 
Consideration must be “fresh”, for example by the promisee exceeding his or her original obligation. 
5  See, e.g., Smith v. Dawson (1923), 53 O.L.R. 615 (C.A.); Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University 
Construction Ltd (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 19 (C.A.), [1976] O.J. No. 2087 (QL) Modular Windows of 
Canada v. Command Construction, [1984] O.J. No. 1340 (QL), aff’d [1986] O.J. No. 437 (C.A.) 
(QL). 
6  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 19. 
7  See B. Coote, “Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law” (1990–91), 3 J.C.L. 23 at p. 27; P. 
Benson, “The Unity of Contract Law”, in P. Benson (ed.), The Theory of Contract: New Essays 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 4, at pp. 154–55 and 177–79. 
8  Cf. C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1981), at p. 34. 
9  Supra, footnote 1, at paras. 23–24. 
10  Ibid., at paras. 25–26. 
11  [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.), [1990] 1 All E.R. 512 (Williams v. Roffey Bros.). 
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could subsist in the form of incidental “factual” or “practical” benefits or advantages 
accruing (or expected to accrue) to the promisor from his or her continued contractual 
relationship with the promisee. However, rather than simply following Williams v. Roffey 
Bros., Robertson J.A. advanced what he described as an “incremental change”12 in the 
law that “built upon”13 the English Court of Appeal’s decision in that case. His new rule 
is this: 
 
[A] post-contractual modification, unsupported by consideration, may be enforceable so long as it is 
established that the variation was not procured under economic duress.14 
 
Now, in support of this so-called “refinement”15 to the classical consideration 
doctrine, Robertson J.A. offered several of what he accepted as “valid policy reasons” for 
a rule-change. First,16 the Stilk v. Myrick pre-existing duty rule is unsatisfactory because 
it is both over-inclusive (capturing renegotiations induced by coercion so long as 
consideration is present) and under-inclusive (excluding gratuitous agreements not 
induced by economic duress). Basically, the rule offends reality and lacks “commercial 
efficacy” because it ignores the practical necessity, at times, for reasonable parties to 
adjust their bargains to deal with unanticipated post-contractual contingencies and, 
because it does that, it fails to protect such parties’ “legitimate expectations” that their 
voluntary adjustments will be recognized in law as enforceable. Second, the 
consideration doctrine (together with the defensive-only doctrine of promissory estoppel) 
works “to impose an injustice on those promisees who have acted in good faith and to 
their detriment in relying on the enforceability of the contractual modification”.17 Courts 
have sought to avoid this consequence by disingenuously inventing consideration in 
support of what really is a gratuitous promise, whereas they would do better to openly 
recognize that there might be other sound reasons, besides the presence of bargained-for 
consideration, for legally enforcing gratuitous promises. Manipulative and “fictitious” 
attempts by courts to find consideration where “justice” demands enforcement does 
nothing to promote legal certainty or to strengthen the law of contract. The advocated 
change in the law, therefore, would “relieve[…] the courts of the embarrassing task of 
offering unconvincing reasons why a contractual modification should be enforced”.18 
Third, the Stilk v. Myrick rule is merely a product of “the commercial realities of another 
era” and should not be permitted to ossify the law and commercial activity in the face of 
																																																								
12  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 28. 
13  Ibid., at para. 27. 
14  Ibid., at para. 31. See also ibid., at paras. 7, 27 and 33. 
15  Ibid., at paras. 7 and 27. 
16  Ibid., at para. 28, relying on J.D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2005), at 
pp. 381–82. I am myself unaware of any cases where the technical presence of consideration has 
saved an agreement from unenforceability where, as a separate matter, it has been found that 
agreement was induced by improper coercion. Professor McCamus provides no example. He merely 
says that “there may be cases” of that nature (ibid., 382). I cannot, with respect, conceive of such a 
case properly being decided. 
17  Ibid., at para. 29, relying on S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 5th ed. (Toronto, Canada Law 
Book, 2005), at p. 83. 
18  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 32. 
	 5
modern policy objectives, that is, to the extent that the pre-existing duty rule currently 
interferes with those objectives.19 
As with the English Court of Appeal’s view of its own decision in Williams v. 
Roffey Bros., Robertson J.A. saw his Court’s move as merely “refining” the consideration 
doctrine to the extent of the new rule, and not as abrogating the authority of Stilk v. 
Myrick. He said: “… I wish to emphasize that I am not advocating the abrogation of the 
rule in Stilk v. Myrick. Simply, the rule should not be regarded as determinative as to 
whether a gratuitous promise is enforceable.”20 Hence, the Court’s reform initiative is 
described as an “incremental”, rather than “major”, change in the law, in order to 
circumvent the Supreme Court’s earlier admonition as to the role of the courts versus that 
of the legislature.21 
 
(c) The “Economic Duress” Issue: A New Framework of Analysis 
 
Since Nav Canada’s claim for payment under the post-contractual modification of 
the ASF Agreement could not, ex hypothesi the reformed pre-existing duty rule, fail for 
want of fresh consideration, the Airport’s liability to pay the promised amount now 
turned on whether Nav Canada22 could show that the promise had not been extracted by 
economic duress on its part. In addressing the economic duress issue, Robertson J.A. 
began by noting the paucity of Supreme Court of Canada decisions in the field.23 This 
dearth of authority has resulted in Canada’s intermediate courts largely adopting the 
English jurisprudence on the subject,24 particularly as expressed by Lord Scarman in two 
leading cases, Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long25 — where duress was defined as “a coercion of 
the will so as to vitiate consent”26 — and Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. 
International Transport Workers’ Federation (The “Universe Sentinel”),27 where, just 
																																																								
19  Ibid., at para. 31. 
20  Ibid., at para. 32. 
21  Ibid., at para. 31, citing Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750, [1989] S.C.J. No. 94 (QL), at para. 
13 and R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97 (QL), at para. 37. 
22  Note the shift of the usual legal or persuasive burden here, necessitated no doubt by the Court’s 
abandonment of the classical consideration requirement for post-contractual modifications. 
Robertson J.A. held that the enforcing party (here Nav Canada) must establish either that the 
modification was not procured by economic duress or that the other party is precluded from 
disaffirming the contract for duress by subsequent affirmation of the modification. The orthodox 
position, however, as with other affirmative defences (such as unconscionability and undue 
influence), is that the burden of making out the defence is generally on the party asserting it; see, 
e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland plc. v. Etridge (No. 2), [2002] 2 A.C. 773 (H.L.), at para. 13, per Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead. Robertson J.A., however, is correct about the onus of proof for affirmation, 
as the allegation of affirmation rendering purported rescission of a transaction nugatory raises a 
separate legal issue; see, e.g., Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd., 
[1971] A.C. 850 at p. 878, 878–88, per Lord Pearson (waiver); Coastal Estates Pty. Ltd. v. 
Melevende, [1965] V.R. 433 at p. 444–45, per Sholl J. 
23  Supra, footnote 1, at paras. 36–37. 
24  Most notably in Stott v. Merit Investment Corp. (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 545 (C.A.), [1988] O.J. No. 134 
(QL); Gordon v. Roebuck (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), [1992] O.J. No. 1499 (QL), and Techform 
Products Ltd. v. Wolda (2001), 206 D.L.R. (4th) 171, (2001), 15 C.P.R. (4th) 44, [2001] O.J. No. 
3822 (QL). 
25  [1979] 3 All E.R. 65, [1980] A.C. 614 (P.C.) (Pao On). 
26  Ibid., at p. 78, p. 635. 
27  [1982] 2 All E.R. 67, [1983] 1 A.C. 366 (H.L.) (The Universe Sentinel). 
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two years later, Lord Scarman re-orientated the doctrine away from the apparently28 
victim-centred formulation in Pao On, toward a two-element test for duress that 
implicated both the victim’s and the alleged coercer’s rights, interests and liberties in the 
inquiry: “The authorities … reveal two elements in the wrong of duress: (1) pressure 
amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure 
exerted.”29 
In the subject case, however, Robertson J.A. declined to recognize “illegitimacy” of 
the pressure as an essential element of economic duress, at least with respect to cases 
involving post-contractual modifications to executory contracts when the nature of the 
claim is declaratory or restitutionary only: “It is not the legitimacy of the pressure that is 
important but rather its impact on the victim, unless, perhaps, one is attempting to 
establish that a finding of economic duress qualifies as an independent tort.”30 His 
Honour viewed the “true cornerstone” of the duress doctrine as “the lack of ‘consent’”31 
and was puzzled as to why Lord Scarman chose to introduce “illegitimacy” of the 
pressure exerted into the analytical framework for duress.32 He lamented the fact that “the 
criterion of illegitimate pressure has been absorbed into the fabric of the Canadian 
jurisprudence without comment”,33 and considered it to “add[…] unnecessary complexity 
to the law of economic duress”.34 Justice Robertson also opined that the criterion “lacks a 
compelling juridical justification”,35 at least regarding its application in connection with 
the enforceability of post-contractual modifications. Outside situations of actual or 
threatened tortious or criminal conduct, and perhaps “bad faith” demands for a contract 
variation, he asserted that the law provides no “workable template for distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate pressure”,36 that is, where the pressure applied in 
support of the particular demand is not itself unlawful. “Regrettably”, he declared, “no 
one, judge or commentator alike, has been able to explain how one goes about answering 
that question.”37 (It is salient, in this connection, to record his Honour’s operative legal 
premise here that “a threatened breach of contract is not only lawful but in fact 
constitutes a right which can be exercised subject to the obligation to pay damages and 
possibly to an order for specific performance”.38) For these reasons, and for the purposes 
of deciding the appeal, Robertson J.A. held that “illegitimate pressure is not a condition 
																																																								
28  I say “apparently” here because Lord Scarman viewed his conception of duress in Pao On (supra, 
footnote 25, at p. 635) as being “in line with what was said in this Board’s decision in Barton v. 
Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104, 121 by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale”, which decision 
emphasized illegitimacy of the pressure as well. 
29  Supra, footnote 27, at p. 88, p. 400. 
30  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 7. See also ibid., at para. 50, agreeing with M.H. Ogilvie, “Forbearance 
and Economic Duress: Three Strikes and You’re Still Out at the Ontario Court of Appeal” (2004), 29 
Queen’s L.J. 809, at p. 821. 
31  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 7. 
32  Ibid., at para. 49. 
33  Ibid., at para. 44. 
34  Ibid., at para. 47. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid., at para. 43. 
38  Ibid., at para. 46. See also the discussion, infra, footnotes 75–78. 
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precedent to a finding of economic duress where the remedy being sought is declaratory 
or restitutionary in nature”.39 
Having rejected the “illegitimate pressure” requirement for determining the 
existence of economic duress in the post-contractual modification context, it remained for 
Robertson J.A. to erect an alternative general analytical framework that he could then 
apply to the facts of the dispute at hand. The framework he propounded is this: 
 
First, the promise (the contractual variation) must be extracted as a result of the exercise of 
“pressure”, whether characterized as a “demand” or a “threat”.[40] Second, the exercise of that 
pressure must have been such that the coerced party had no practical alternative but to agree to the 
coercer’s demand to vary the terms of the underlying contract.41 
 
Justice Robertson, however, made it clear that these two conditions precedent, while 
necessary for a finding of economic duress, are not conclusive or sufficient. They are 
“initial” or “threshold” conditions only, and a finding of economic duress “does not 
automatically follow” upon their being met.42 Satisfaction of the first two conditions is 
still subject to the “ultimate question” of whether the alleged victim “consented to” the 
variation. In answering that supreme question, his Honour stated, the court should 
examine three further factors (the last two of which are more likely to affect the outcome 
of the case than the first): 
 
(1) whether the promise was supported by consideration; (2) whether the coerced party made the 
promise “under protest” or “without prejudice”; and (3) if not, whether the coerced party took 
reasonable steps to disaffirm the promise as soon as practicable.43 
 
Applying this framework to the facts at hand, the Court held the parties’ post-
contractual modification to be voidable on the ground of economic duress. First, the two 
threshold conditions precedent to a successful plea of economic duress were met: (1) Nav 
Canada exerted pressure by making an implicit threat to breach the contract by 
withholding performance unless the Airport promised to the pay the $223,000 cost of the 
DME; and (2) given that Nav Canada exercised a monopoly with respect to the provision 
of aviation services and equipment to public airports throughout Canada, the Airport was 
left with “no practical alternative” but to submit to Nav Canada’s demand for an 
agreement to pay. Moreover, the Airport did not “consent to” the variation despite the 
circumstances in which that party’s promise was made. The absence of “classical” 
consideration for the variation, as well as written protests made by the Airport at the time 
of its agreeing to the variation, supported a finding of absence of consent. So did the fact 
																																																								
39  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 49. 
40  Although space precludes pursuance of the point, I am confused as to how pressure is characterized 
here as a “demand” or a “threat”. Surely pressure by way of duress occurs by way of threat and 
demand, the threat being used to support a specific demand? The threat, however, might indeed be 
explicit or implicit, as Robertson J.A. validly recognized ibid., at para. 54. 
41  Ibid., at para. 53. It is perhaps unfortunate that Robertson J.A. here refers to the promisor as “the 
coerced party”, when we do not yet know whether the promisor is in fact the victim of legal coercion 
(duress) until all stated conditions and factors of his analytical framework for economic duress are 
met. It begs the question, therefore. 
42  Ibid., at para. 53. 
43  Ibid. 
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that the Airport had done nothing to acquiesce in the modification through lapse of time. 
The variation being executory, the Airport had simply persisted in its original refusal to 
pay even after Nav Canada had fulfilled its obligations under the ASF Agreement. 
 
3. Critique of the Court’s Reasoning in Nav Canada 
 
(a) Reflections on the Court’s Abandonment of the Consideration Requirement for 
Informal Contract Variations 
 
Contract lawyers are likely to differ over the extent to which the Court’s 
abandonment of the consideration requirement for informal post-contractual 
modifications of executory contracts can really be described as a mere “refinement” to 
the classical consideration doctrine, or as an “incremental” (as opposed to a “major”) 
change in the law. Certainly, to the full extent that a contractual variation is itself a 
contract, and that a contract upon its formation involves an immediate transfer of right, 
the pre-existing duty rule is a logical imperative consistent with contract law’s own 
premises. Still, experience or expedience reveals that logic can sometimes produce 
disutility, and so it is not surprising that, consistently with the Court’s justifications for its 
initiative in the instant case, calls for reform of the consideration requirement, for 
example via statute,44 have long been made. However, and with respect, it is difficult to 
comprehend how Robertson J.A. could sincerely state that he was not advocating a 
judicial “abrogation” of the rule in Stilk v. Myrick while in the same breath jettisoning 
altogether the need at common law for fresh consideration in support of an informal 
contract modification. To my mind, those are inconsistent propositions or moves. 
Certainly, it is difficult to see how abandonment of the consideration requirement for a 
post-contractual modification can been seen as merely “refining” a doctrine that logically 
commands such a requirement, or as a “minor” change in the law only, especially 
considering that the pre-existing duty rule has been long recognized and applied in 
Canada, at least up to the penultimate appellate level. It might have been just as well, if 
not considerably better, if Robertson J.A. had determined to assist Nav Canada’s45 claim 
for payment by repairing the rule that promissory estoppel can only be used as a shield 
and not as a sword46 — a rule the existence of which his Honour openly regretted,47 and 
																																																								
44  See, e.g., F.M.B. Reynolds and G.H. Treitel, “Consideration for the Modification of Contracts” 
(1965), 7 Malaya L. Rev. 1 at pp. 18–19 and 21–23; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on 
Sale of Goods (Ottawa, Ministry of Attorney General, 1979), vol. II at pp. 96–103, vol. III, Draft Bill 
at s. 4.8. Compare Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract 
(Ottawa, Ministry of Attorney General, 1987), p. 33. 
45  Although, in the light of his Honour’s finding on economic duress, it is difficult to see how Nav 
Canada could have come to the court with “clean hands”; cf. D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1966] 2 
Q.B. 617 at p. 625, per Lord Denning M.R. Also, the remedy in promissory estoppel situations is not 
guaranteed and is limited, at least in theory, to eliminating the detrimental reliance suffered by the 
promisee as a result of the promisor’s unconscionable conduct. Nav Canada, therefore, even if had 
come with clean hands, could not have been certain that the Airport’s promise would have been 
enforced via the device of a reformed law of estoppel in Canada. 
46  Combe v. Combe [1951] 1 All E.R. 767 (C.A.), [1951] 2 K.B. 215; and see the discussion of the state 
of promissory estoppel in Canada in N.M. v. A.T.A., [2003] B.C.J. No. 1139, 2003 BCCA 279. 
47  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 22. Later in the Court’s judgment his Honour stated (ibid., at para. 29): 
“The notion that detrimental reliance can only be invoked if the promisee is the defendant to the 
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which is at least as untenable in policy and as unjust as the pre-existing duty rule that 
ultimately became the object of the Court’s condemnation and reform in the case — as 
this move would have had the effect of not compromising an internal organ of contract 
(i.e., by ensuring that the doctrine of consideration is not “overthrown by a side-wind”48), 
while allaying fears that a non-contractual promise can be enforceable as a contractual 
promise.49 Moreover, is not unquestionably normatively correct that the law should 
demand no more as preconditions to the enforceability of informal post-contractual 
variations than contractual intention and genuine consent. Indeed, one judge of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, while accepting the need for modernization of the 
requirement of consideration in the context of variations of existing contracts, was 
recently prepared to follow the reasoning in Nav Canada “only so far as enforcing a post-
contractual variation in the absence of consideration if the evidence established either 
detrimental reliance by the plaintiff or the gaining of a benefit or advantage by the 
defendant”.50 He was “not persuaded that equity calls for enforceability where neither of 
those elements are present”.51 
Yet for all that, one can understand why the Court in Nav Canada wanted to 
effectuate the reform it did, for the reasons it did, and to downplay the significance of the 
initiative so as to avoid the Supreme Court’s admonition about courts not usurping 
Parliament’s role. If credit is due to the New Brunswick court at all, it must lie in the fact 
that rather than adopting the English Court of Appeal’s hopelessly misconceived 
“practical benefit” approach to consideration in Williams v. Roffey Bros.,52 Robertson 
J.A.’s solution to the problems perceived to besiege the pre-existing duty rule was instead 
to recognize a contract of variation for which no consideration is required — a solution 
																																																																																																																																																																					
action (i.e., as a shield and not as a sword) is simply unfair and leads to an unjust result if the 
promisor was not acting under economic duress.” 
48  Combe v. Combe, supra, footnote 46, at p. 770, p. 220, per Denning L.J. 
49  Generally, see Brennan J.’s judgment in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v. Maher (1988), 164 C.L.R. 
387 (H.C.A.), at pp. 425 and 426–47. Of course, as soon as Williams v. Roffey Bros., supra, footnote 
11, was decided it was argued that equitable estoppel would have been a better solution to the 
perceived problems with the pre-existing duty rule, thereby leaving the traditional conception of 
consideration intact. See, e.g., D. Halyk, “Consideration, Practical Benefits and Promissory 
Estoppel: Enforcement of Contract Modification Promises In Light of Williams v. Roffey Brothers” 
(1991), 55 Sask. L. Rev. 393; M. Chen-Wishart, “The Enforceability of Additional Contractual 
Promises: A Question of Consideration?” (1991), 14 N.Z.U.L.R. 270 at pp. 280–82. 
50  River Wind Ventures Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 589, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 6237, [2009] 
B.C.W.L.D. 6346, at para. 33, per I.C. Meiklem J. 
51  Ibid. 
52  The many criticisms of the Williams v. Roffey Bros. approach are conveniently summarized in M. 
Chen-Wishart, “Consideration: Practical Benefit and the Emperor’s New Clothes”, in J. Beatson and 
D. Friedmann (eds.), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1995), ch. 5. Brian Coote, in his “Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law”, supra, footnote 7, 
and in his “Consideration and the Variation of Contracts”, [2003] N.Z. Law Review 361, shows very 
effectively how the “practical benefit” approach to consideration is misconceived. Because an 
informal variation must be reached according to the usual rules for the formation of a simple 
contract, this requires consideration of the same kind required for contract formation. It cannot 
follow, therefore, that the consideration for an executory bilateral contract of variation can consist in 
the anticipated benefits of performance of the contract itself, as by hypothesis the results of that 
performance come too late.	
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that, on one view of the contract facility at least, is supportable in theory.53 Nor is 
Robertson J.A.’s move without precedent in Anglo-Commonwealth contract law. In 
Antons Trawling Co. Ltd. v. Smith,54 the New Zealand Court of Appeal was satisfied that 
Stilk v. Myrick could no longer be taken to control the enforceability of informal 
variations of existing contracts “where there is no element of duress or other policy factor 
suggesting an agreement, duly performed, should not attract the legal consequences that 
each party must reasonably be taken to have expected”.55 Although the New Zealand 
court’s reasons for abandoning the consideration requirement in relation to modifying 
promises were not identical to Robertson J.A.’s reasons for doing likewise in Nav 
Canada,56 the Antons case seems to have passed into New Zealand law with little adverse 
comment or consequences. Indeed, one prominent New Zealand contract-law scholar, 
writing shortly after Antons was decided,57 concluded that if a solution had to be found 
for the problems perceived to infect the Stilk v. Myrick rule, abandonment of the 
consideration requirement for variations is the least-bad one, as although it creates an 
exception, it leaves the doctrine of consideration otherwise unscathed. Still, some might 
remain uncomfortable with such an abandonment being implemented, if not by 
Parliament, then in the common law by an intermediate appellate court as opposed to one 
of final resort. 
 
(b) Reflections on the Court’s New Analytical Framework for Adjudicating Economic 
Duress Claims in Post-Contractual Modification Situations 
 
Of course, in adjudicating the enforceability of contract variations, both the Nav 
Canada and Antons reform initiatives result in much greater stress now being placed on 
the policing function and discriminatory capabilities of the modern doctrine of economic 
duress.58 This may be a lot to ask of a doctrine that some courts regard as still in the 
process of development,59 although it should perhaps better be seen as an opportunity for 
courts and academics to now confront the challenge of defining, refining and 
understanding that particular exculpatory doctrine. 
																																																								
53  Cf. Coote, “Consideration and the Variation of Contracts”, ibid., at p. 376: “There can be no 
objection in theory to the notion of a contract without consideration, the concept of consideration 
being peculiar to the common law system.” Generally, on the contract facility, see B. Coote, 
Contract As Assumption: Essays on a Theme (R. Bigwood (ed.), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), ch. 
2 (“The Essence of Contract”). 
54  [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 23 (C.A.) (Antons). 
55  Ibid., at para 93. 
56  In Antons, Baragwanath J. for the Court saw the importance of consideration “as a valuable signal 
that the parties intend to be bound by their agreement, rather than an end in itself. Where the parties 
who have already made such intention clear by entering legal relations have acted upon an 
agreement to a variation, in the absence of policy reasons to the contrary they should be bound by 
their agreement” (ibid). 
57  See Coote, “Consideration and the Variation of Contracts”, supra, footnote 52; “Consideration and 
Variations: A Different Solution” (2004), 120 L.Q.R. 19. 
58  Or, in Antons, other “policy reasons”, which may well envisage something less than fraud or duress 
sufficing to invalidate an apparent variation. 
59  See, e.g., Musumeci v. Winadell Pty. Ltd. (1994), 34 N.S.W.L.R. 723 at pp. 742–43; Deemcope Pty. 
Ltd. v. Cantown Pty. Ltd., [1995] 2 V.R. 44 at p. 47; A.N.Z. Banking Group v. Karam (2005), 64 
N.S.W.L.R. 149 (Karam). 
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Does the Court’s new framework for analyzing economic duress claims in Nav 
Canada represent the best comprehension and rationalization of economic duress in cases 
involving post-contractual modifications of executory contracts, even when the claim is 
merely declaratory or restitutionary in nature? Again with respect to the Court, I submit 
not. In my view the Court was wrong in principle (as well as on authority) to reject 
“illegitimacy” of pressure as a vital component of the claim, and to erect in consequence 
a unifocal, victim-sided, consent-based conception of legal coercion (duress). Although 
distinctive considerations might well apply to economic duress claims in particular,60 and 
despite a history of canalization of various categories or “forms” of duress (duress to the 
person, duress to goods, duress colore officii, undue pressure in equity, and the like), the 
modern law of duress applies, as it should, a singular generic test for all private-law 
duress claims. For most legal systems of the British Commonwealth this is Lord 
Scarman’s two-element test from The Universe Sentinel61 — the very test rejected, 
ultimately unconvincingly, by the Court in Nav Canada. In my view, Lord Scarman’s 
dual test for duress is superior to Robertson J.A.’s new analytical framework precisely 
because it responds to both the quality of the conduct of the promisee and the quality of 
its effect on the promisor’s contractual assent, acknowledging their respective roles in the 
reckoning. The test does not, in other words, like Robertson J.A.’s purely victim-sided 
account of duress, view each party’s rights and interests in isolation of the rights and 
interests of the other. Duress is treated normatively. The legal question of whether the 
claimant acted “under duress” is viewed as inseparable from the question of what each 
party’s respective background “rights” (including their respective liberties, privileges and 
immunities) were in the circumstances of the encounter that produced the impugned 
transaction.62 It is, therefore, also consistent with highly developed rights-based 
philosophical accounts of coercion, such as Nozick’s63 and Wertheimer’s.64 
It might be thought curious, therefore, that Robertson J.A. in Nav Canada was so 
puzzled as to why Lord Scarman chose to incorporate the concept of “illegitimate 
pressure” into his twofold test for duress. First, it is notable that his Lordship introduced 
that test with the words: “The authorities upon which [Barton v. Armstrong65 and Pao 
																																																								
60  See, e.g., the discussion by Mance J. (and he then was) in Huyton S.A. v. Peter Cremer GmbH & 
Co., [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 620 at p. 636 (Huyton). 
61  Supra, footnote 27. See also Dimskal Shipping Co. S.A. v. International Transport Workers 
Federation (“The Evia Luck”), [1992] 2 A.C. 152 (H.L), at p. 165G, per Lord Goff of Chieveley, 
and Attorney-General of England and Wales v. R., [2004] 2 N.Z.L.R. 577 (P.C.), at p. 583, para. 15, 
per Lord Hoffmann (for the majority). For example, The Universe Sentinel test was adopted in New 
Zealand in Shivas v. Bank of New Zealand, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327 (H.C.), at p. 344–45, per Tipping 
J., and in New South Wales in Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corp. (1988), 
19 N.S.W.L.R. 40 (N.S.W.C.A.), at p. 45, per McHugh J.A. 
62  For further discussion, see H. Stewart, “A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress”, (1997) 47 
U.T.L.J. 175; “Economic Duress in Canadian Law: Towards a Principled Approach”, (2003) 82 Can. 
Bar Rev. 359. 
63  R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974), at p. 262; R. Nozick, 
“Coercion”, in S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Method 
(New York: St Martin’s Press,	1969), at p. 440 et seq. 
64  A. Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987). See also G. Dworkin, 
“Compulsion and Moral Concepts” (1968), 78 Ethics 227 at p. 229; J. Raz, “Liberalism, Autonomy, 
and the Politics of Neutral Concern” (1982), 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 89 at p. 110. 
65  [1975] 2 All E.R. 465, [1976] A.C. 104 (P.C.). 
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On] were based reveal [the two elements of duress then stated].”66 In other words, Lord 
Scarman viewed the requirement as an accepted part of the modern law of duress already, 
although granted one would not necessarily be left with that impression based on his 
Lordship’s rather victim-consent-focused presentation of the doctrine in Pao On.67 In the 
earlier case of Barton v. Armstrong, however, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale had stated in their dissenting68 advice that “the pressure must be one of a kind 
which the law does not regard as legitimate”,69 and Lord Scarman quoted these words as 
authoritative. Indeed, as a matter of intellectual history, the process of reception of the 
illegitimacy criterion into English and Commonwealth law has been well traced.70 
Secondly, it will be recalled, Robertson J.A. also considered that the “illegitimacy” 
component of Lord Scarman’s formulation lacked a compelling juridical justification, at 
least in connection with merely determining the enforceability of contract variations. But 
surely the demands of corrective justice apply equally to parties renegotiating contracts as 
to other private-law transactions and encounters? Corrective justice, of course, 
presupposes a normatively persuasive, individualized reason for linking D to the plight 
(here involuntary assent) of P, thereby requiring, in turn, that the pre-existing equality 
between D and P be restored, typically in the present context by treating the transaction 
as revocable at P’s election, at least as against D (if not bona fide purchasers for value). 
Importantly, corrective justice links the individual parties in a bipolar relationship of 
“wrongdoer” and “victim”, and it “rejects all one-sided accounts, regardless of the 
particular side singled out”.71 Lord Scarman’s formulation of duress in The Universe 
Sentinel conforms perfectly to this conception of justice because it purports to reveal 
something about the interaction between the parties that both excuses the promisor of her 
legal contractual obligation and legitimately deprives the promisee, the beneficiary of 
that obligation, of the rights that he was otherwise to enjoy thereunder.72 Ordinarily, 
under the various exculpatory doctrines of contract law, there is insufficient reason for 
disappointing the contractual expectations of a promisee unless that promisee ought to 
bear some responsibility for the promisor’s inability to bring a genuine consent to the 
transaction.73 That the promisee’s expectations happened to result from some substantial 
impairment of bargaining capacity or opportunity on the part of the promisor cannot 
plausibly supply the reason, since, on a liberal corrective justice view of contract at least, 
this would fail to afford sufficient weight to the promisee’s liberty to order, as best he 
																																																								
66  To be fair, his Honour is not the only one to be mystified in this regard. See, e.g., M.H. Ogilvie, 
“Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or Dead-end?” (2000), 34 Can. Bus. L.J. 194 at 
pp. 219–220 and 224 (cited by Robertson J.A. at para. 45 of the Court’s judgment, supra, footnote 
1); S.A. Smith, “Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress”, [1997] C.L.J. 343 at p. 345. 
67  But see also my comments supra, footnote 28. 
68  Their Lordships dissented not as to the legal principles involved, only as to their application to the 
facts at hand. The majority appeared to be in agreement with the minority’s observations on the 
governing law, as Lord Scarman recognized in Pao On, supra, footnote 25, at p. 78f–g, p. 635C. 
69  Supra, footnote 65, at p. 476–77, p. 121. 
70  See, e.g., M. Cope, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscientious Bargains (Sydney: Law Book 
Co., 1985), ch. 3. 
71  E.J. Weinrib, “Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice” (2000), 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
1 at p. 6. 
72  Compare also Stewart, “A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress”, supra, footnote 62, at p. 200. 
73  This is a major theme in R. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
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sees fit, his affairs through cooperative private exchange with the promisor, which liberty 
is as much at stake as the promisor’s equivalent liberty in free competitive bargaining 
situations. Accordingly, Lord Scarman’s emphasis on “illegitimacy” of pressure reflects 
the correlative structure of a corrective justice claim, and supplies the reason in justice for 
linking the promisee to the promisor’s plight (or objections) and for disappointing the 
promisee’s expectations that are normally founded juridically upon the promisor’s 
objective assent to the impugned transaction. Justice Robertson’s new framework for 
adjudicating economic duress claims, in contrast, by rejecting the illegitimacy of pressure 
requirement, pays too much attention to the promisor’s claim (or “lack of consent”) while 
paying no, or at least insufficient, attention to the promisee’s own legitimate interest as an 
agent in freedom of action functioning within a liberal institution of contract. 
Thirdly, Robertson J.A.’s rejection of the “illegitimacy of pressure” requirement 
was unnecessary for deciding the case anyway. It will be recalled that his Honour 
regarded the criterion as adding “unnecessary complexity” to the economic duress 
inquiry, and that the law lacked a “workable template for distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate pressure”.74 However, this was because, relying on his own 
judgment in an earlier case concerning the assessment of damages for “anticipatory 
repudiation” of a contract for the sale of goods,75 he treated the dispute before him as one 
involving “lawful” pressure: “a threatened breach of contract is not only lawful but in fact 
constitutes a right which can be exercised subject to the obligation to pay damages and 
possibly to an order for specific performance”.76 This “option” view of contractual 
obligation, notice, has been consistently rejected by the senior courts of other major 
Commonwealth legal systems,77 but even if Robertson J.A. were correct in his 
																																																								
74  Robertson J.A.’s remark that “no one, judge or commentator alike, has been able to explain how one 
goes about [distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate pressure when one has a ‘right’ to breach 
one’s contract]” (supra, footnote 1, at para. 43) is disappointing given that the Court’s judgment 
does not reveal a wide-ranging survey of the sizeable literature in the field, whether in Canada or 
abroad. The Court might have considered, for example: R.A. Hillman, “Policing Contract 
Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress” (1979), 64 Iowa 
L. Rev. 849; V.A. Aivazian, M.J. Trebilcock and M. Penny, “The Law of Contract Modifications: 
The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability” (1984), 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 173; R. 
Halson, “Opportunism, Economic Duress and Contractual Modifications” (1991), 107 L.Q.R. 649; 
R. Bigwood, “Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress” (1996), 46 U.T.L.J. 201, 
especially at pp. 238–51; and the commentary and jurisprudence under §176(1)(d) and (2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
75  Hillspring Farms Ltd. v. Leland Walton & Sons Ltd., (2007), 312 N.B.R. (2d) 109, [2007] N.B.J. No. 
19 (QL), 2007 NBCA 7 (Hillspring Farms). However, all his Honour there says (ibid., at paras. 14 
and 36) is that, in deciding the case, he begins with the premise that, generally at least, the law does 
not, by means of punishment, discourage parties from deliberately breaching a contract for the 
purpose of profit-maximization. But clearly it does not follow from this premise that parties 
therefore have a juridical right to deliberately breach their contracts for that purpose (or any other).	
76  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 46. 
77  See, e.g., South Wales Miner’s Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd., [1905] A.C. 239 
(H.L.), at p. 253 per Lord Lindley (“Any party to a contract can break it if he chooses; but in point of 
law he is not entitled to break it even on offering to pay damages.”); Zhu v. Treasurer of N.S.W. 
(2004), 218 C.L.R. 530 (H.C.A.), at para. 129; Tabcorp Holdings Ltd. v. Bowen Investments Pty. 
Ltd., [2009] HCA 8 (H.C.A.), at para. 13. See also Frye v Hubbell, 374 A. 325 (1907), at p. 333; 
Goldsbrough Mort & Co. Ltd. v. Quinn (1910), 10 C.L.R. 674 (H.C.A.), at p. 691, per Isaacs J.; C. 
Czarnikow Ltd v. Koufos, [1966] 2 Q.B. 695 at pp. 730–31, per Diplock L.J.; Coulls v. Bagot’s 
Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. (1967), 119 C.L.R. 460 (H.C.A.), at p. 504, per Windeyer J.; George 
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(unsubstantiated78) outlook on the nature of contractual rights,79 by the premise’s own 
qualifications Nav Canada’s proposal ought to have been regarded as “illegitimate” 
pressure, either because Nav Canada was, as is typical in economic duress situations, 
conditionally proposing to withhold its performance under the ASF Agreement without 
an offer of compensation to the Airport,80 or else because, owing to the bilateral 
situational monopoly status of Nav Canada, this was a case where, had the service-
provider actually withheld its performance under the contract, the Airport might well 
have expected an order for specific performance from the court.81 Nav Canada’s threat 
was not, therefore, one of “lawful action” after all; hence one of the Court’s premises for 
rejecting the illegitimacy requirement was flawed from the start. Justice Robertson, 
however, was correct to acknowledge the awesome task that judicial officers face when 
presented with lawful-act duress claims. It is inevitable, given the nature of such claims, 
that courts will be forced to wrestle with the justifiable limitations on otherwise 
unrestrained rights, privileges or freedoms, and there is no a priori test that can guide 
judges to the right answer in advance of the facts of individual cases they might 
encounter. Surely no one expects (economic) lawful-act duress claims to be 
uncontroversial and easy, or to command or generate greater certainty than their nature or 
subject matter can realistically afford. Indeed, it might well be thought that judges are 
paid precisely to perform such difficult evaluative analytical tasks, and that they cannot 
absolve themselves of such a responsibility by the simple device of surgically excising 
whatever doctrinal criteria happen to tax them. Interestingly, the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal recently recommended abandonment of the terms “economic duress” and 
“illegitimate pressure” in connection with lawful-act duress claims, in favour of the 
adoption of “equitable principles relating to unconscionability”.82 However, if vagueness 
is indeed an insurmountable problem in relation to doctrinal criteria like “illegitimate 
pressure” in the (economic) duress inquiry, are they really any more vague than the 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., [1983] Q.B. 284 (C.A.), at p. 305, per Oliver 
L.J.; Butler v. Countrywide Finance Ltd., [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 623 (H.C.), at 635, per Hammond J. 
78  In neither Hillspring Farms nor Nav Canada does Robertson J.A. even cite the opinion of Major J., 
for the Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of America v. Mutual Trust Co., [2002] S.C.R. 601 at para. 
31, that “[e]fficient breach should not be discouraged by the courts”. But neither is Major J.’s 
support for this idea substantiated by full and robust reasons in that case. No consideration is given, 
for example, to the growing body of literature and case law taking the contrary view.  	
79  Notice, as well, that Robertson J.A. seems to contradict himself later in his judgment, supra, 
footnote 1, at para. 62: “[T]he supposed good faith of the coercer should not impact on the victim’s 
contractual right and expectation to receive performance in accordance with the original terms of the 
contract” (emphasis added).	
80  For this reason I am not convinced by Robertson J.A.’s assertion/belief that “[i]f we apply Lord 
Scarman’s approach it should follow that most contractual variations will be classified as having 
been procured through the exercise of legitimate pressure” (ibid., at para. 46). That would only 
follow if it were true that promisees, in support of their demands for a contract modification, 
threatened to commit a compensated harm against their promisors, but the reality, based at least on 
the decided cases, is that they never do! 
81  Cf., e.g., Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd., [1974] 1 All E.R. 954, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 576 
(Ch.). 
82  See Karam, supra, footnote 59, at paras. 57 and 62. 
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standards, criteria and qualifying thresholds of the equitable (or statutory) alternatives 
preferred by the New South Wales court?83 
Finally, what Robertson J.A. describes in the Court’s judgment as the “ultimate 
question” — namely, whether the promisor “consented to” the impugned variation — is 
in truth inseparable from what is envisaged by Lord Scarman’s notion of “compulsion of 
the will of the victim” under the first limb of his two-pronged test in The Universe 
Sentinel. There was absolutely no need for the Court in Nav Canada to formulate a new 
analytical framework for adjudicating economic duress claims apart from Lord 
Scarman’s prior test. To be sure, “legal compulsion” (or “lack of consent”) in connection 
with duress means that D’s (illegitimate) pressure had the effect of reducing P’s menu of 
options to the point where P had “no reasonable (practical, acceptable) alternative” but to 
succumb to D’s pressure, by complying with his demand, which P did in fact do for that 
(significant?)84 reason. The compulsion arm of Lord Scarman’s test has two intellectually 
distinct (but practically interactive) dimensions, as is now being recognized in modern 
English85 and New Zealand86 authorities on economic duress, for example. First, there is 
the question of whether the victim actually submitted to the other party’s illegitimate 
pressure, rather than, say, for reasons that the victim herself deemed sufficient.87 This 
refers merely to factual inducement or subjective causation. Second, assuming there has 
been causation in fact, there is then the notionally normative inquiry into whether, given 
the victim’s individual circumstances, she or he ought to have been subjectively induced 
by the pressure to agree to whatever the other party demanded, a negative answer to that 
question functioning, in theory at least, as a substantive limitation on the duress claim. 
The second step involves the court making a judgment as to the “acceptability” of the 
victim’s post-threat alternatives, or concerning the “reasonableness” or “justifiability” of 
his or her decision to succumb to the (illegitimate) pressure rather than, say, pursuing a 
legal or extra-legal alternative that would have been at least as effective, practicable and 
efficient a means of deflecting the pressure as the action or remedy based on the duress 
itself. The two dimensions are forensically interactive, of course, because a lack of 
“reasonable” (“practical”, “acceptable”) choice for the victim resulting from the pressure 
can support a permissible inference that the victim did in fact agree to the impugned 
																																																								
83  Generally, see R. Bigwood, “Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? Four Questions on the 
Demise of Lawful-Act Duress in New South Wales” (2008), 27 U.Q.L.J. 41. 
84  The standard of causation appropriate to duress claims is still the subject of discussion in the case 
law. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss the various possibilities for present purposes. Further 
discussion can be found in Bigwood, supra, footnote 73, at pp. 347–51. 
85  Huyton, supra, footnote 60, at p. 638, per Mance J. (“[A] simple inquiry whether the innocent party 
would have acted as he did ‘but for’ an actual or threatened breach of contract cannot … be the 
hallmark of deflection of will. … [R]elief must … depend on the Court’s assessment of the 
qualitative impact of the illegitimate pressure, objectively assessed. … [The illegitimate pressure 
must be] of a nature or quality, or sufficiently significant in objective terms in deflecting the will, to 
justify relief.”). 
86  Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd. v. Attorney-General (CA 198/03, 16 August 2004), at para. [96];	
McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd., [2009] NZCA 329, at paras. 66–67. 
87  This is recognized by Robertson J.A. supra, footnote 1, at para. 55, and it can explain the result in a 
number of cases, even though “illegitimate” pressure could be said to have been applied by the other 
party: e.g., Pao On, supra, footnote 25; The “Siboen and the “Sibotre”, [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 293. 
Hence, his Honour is correct that the absence of practical alternatives is not conclusive evidence of a 
lack of consent (by which he really means “legal compulsion”). 
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transaction because of the pressure, thus shifting to the alleged coercer an evidential or 
tactical burden on what is a pure question of fact. However, that the claimant did in fact 
submit because of the pressure does not necessarily show that she had no reasonable 
alternative but to do so, although equally a permissible inference on that question might 
well operate, the more so when we consider that, according to Lord Scarman’s two-
pronged test for duress, the alleged coercer would have already been shown to have acted 
wrongly by applying illegitimate pressure to the claimant.88 
With respect, it is also unfortunate that, in answering the “ultimate question” of 
whether the allegedly coerced party “consented to” the impugned variation, the Court in 
Nav Canada included, as one of the factors to be considered if that party had not 
submitted to the demand “under protest” or “without prejudice”, the question of “whether 
the [claimant] took reasonable steps to disaffirm the promise as soon as practicable [after 
the pressure has been removed]”.89 In the course of elaborating this factor inside his 
analytical framework, Robertson J.A. said: “In the absence of a promise made under 
protest, the law insists that the victim take reasonable steps to repudiate or disaffirm the 
promise as soon as practicable.”90 Although I suppose it is possible that a court might 
treat a failure to disavow an allegedly coerced agreement reasonably promptly once fear 
of the threat had been removed as subsequent-conduct circumstantial evidence of the 
alleged victim’s state of mind as it existed at the time of entry into the impugned 
transaction, it is clear from the context of his discussion91 that Robertson J.A. 
contemplated instead such a failure speaking to the question of whether, despite duress 
having been adjudged to have occurred between the parties, the victim could be treated in 
law as having affirmed the contract, which, by dint of the election doctrine, would 
thereby legally preclude him from subsequently disaffirming the contract without a fresh 
reason.92 In other words, the question of affirmation concedes that the complainant has 
already established, to the appropriate standard of proof, that transaction-tainting duress 
occurred inter se, yet the coercer is arguing that the victim should be denied relief 
because of consent (or estoppel) after the event. Affirmation, therefore, is a separate 
question that has nothing to do with whether duress can be found to have transpired 
between the parties or not; hence it should be excised from any framework of analysis 
that is dedicated, ostensibly exclusively, to the adjudication of economic duress claims. 
 
																																																								
88  Cf. Barton v Armstrong, supra, footnote 65, at p. 475–76, p. 120B–C, per Lord Cross of Chelsea (for 
the majority). 
89  Supra, footnote 1, at para. 53. 
90  Ibid., at para. 58 (emphasis added). 
91  See ibid., at paras. 58–59. 
92  It is therefore odd that Robertson J.A. should describe the law as “insisting” that the victim take 
reasonable steps to repudiate or disaffirm the promise as soon as practicable after the pressure is 
removed. In all cases where a party is empowered to disaffirm a contract, “he has in the end to make 
his election, not as a matter of obligation, but in the sense that, if he does not do so, the time may 
come when the law takes the decision out of his hands, either by holding him to have elected not to 
exercise the right which has become available to him or sometimes by holding him to have elected to 
exercise it”; see Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v. Shipping Corporation of India (The 
“Kanchenjunga”), [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 391 (H.L.), at p. 398, per Lord Goff of Chieveley 
(emphasis added). 
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